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The

The

Willis-Harrington

Education Reform

Politics of

Commission:

Robert D. Gaudet

The 1980s have witnessed a nationwide movement
reform efforts in the

New England states.

the challenge of improving

its

schools.

to

upgrade public education, including

Massachusetts periodically has grappled with

During the 1960s, the Massachusetts legislature
state. This mandate was carried out

authorized a thorough examination of education in the

by a blue-ribbon panel that came
sion. In 1965, the

to

be known popularly as the Willis-Harrington Commis-

commission issued a 624-page final report that included findings and

recommendations relating

to

many aspects ofpublic education in the state. This article
and discusses the problems that thwarted im-

chronicles the history of Willis-Harrington

plementation of many of the wide-ranging changes

Between

it

envisioned.

1962 and 1965, the Massachusetts Education Study, known popularly as the

Willis-Harrington Commission, undertook a major examination of public education
in the state. In

September 1961 Senate president Maurice A. Donahue
,

legislation that created the

and the appointments
Beginning

commission. The legislation was enacted

to the

in the spring

its

filed the enabling

February 1962,

commission were completed by the following September.

of 1963, the commission spent thirty months and $300,000 to

assess the strengths and weaknesses of the state's school system. In

commission issued

in

summary

report; in

October 1965,

it

December 1964,

published

its

the

findings in a

final report that included more than one hundred programmatic recommenda"The General Court [the state legislature] would have been hard put to have passed
a broader or more far-reaching resolve," observed an early staff working paper prepared

624-page
tions.

1

for the

commission. 2

Despite the extensive effort and general optimism that characterized the Willis-Harrington

Commission through

the mid-1960s, and despite the support

it

received during this

period both from elected officials and the media, the major difference in Massachusetts
public education after the commission had finished

board structure

making

the

that

new governing boards powerful enough

Robert D. Gaudet

is

its

work was

a reorganization of the

governed the public schools. The commission did not succeed

a marketing and education consultant.

its

in

programmatic goals, and

A political consultant from 1976 to

currently writing a history of Massachusetts education reform.

66

to effect

1984, he

is

education policy as reflected in the classrooms of the

Commonwealth was

changed. The question that arises from any study of this effort

much less

brought about by Willis-Harrington

is,

virtually un-

Why was the change

substantive than the reformers had in-

tended?
This article will begin with a discussion of the circumstances that led to Willis-Harrington, then will

reached.

go on

to describe the

commission's composition and the conclusions

The commission focused most of its

attention

it

on the areas of elementary and

secondary school reform, and the article will further consider the reasons that many of the

changes the commission proposed in these areas were never implemented.

The Mess

in

Bay

State Education

Massachusetts in 1962 was ripe for an extensive evaluation of public education.
lation of 5,

popu-

Its

3
149,00 included a million children of school age, 98 percent of whom

at-

4
tended secondary or elementary institutions. Because of the baby boom, enrollment in

was

the state's school systems
larly those

who

30,000 pupils a year, and parents, particuwere becoming increasingly concerned about the

rising at a rate of

lived in the suburbs,

were receiving. 5 The rapidly growing suburbs were a
education reform during the period. 6

quality of education their children

major constituency

A

for

1962 report prepared by Harvard economist Charles

S.

Benson

for the

New

England

School Development Council asserted that standards in more than 40 percent of the
public schools were below the national average. Additionally, Benson found that in

state's

com-

parison to the nation as a whole, 40 percent of all Massachusetts communities spent less

on education; 41 percent had higher student-teacher
sachusetts teachers

60 percent of the

were not

state's

ratios; the credentials of

many Mas-

good as those of their out-of-state colleagues; and
communities paid less than the yearly national average of $5,135
as

per instructional staff member.

Some

feared that the economic expansion of the 1960s

would lure college graduates away from teaching, toward a more lucrative profession,
thus further depleting the pool of potential teachers.

mula, which

made no

moded," the report

7

The Commonwealth's

said.

8

In and of themselves, however, deficiencies in the education system

form. In September 1961 a series of Boston Globe articles entitled
,

State Education"

documented

the

public view, the articles

They pointed

may have

do not lead

"The Mess

problems of public school education

wealth and called for action to remedy these

rington.

state aid for-

correlation between state aid and local need, was "hopelessly out-

ills.

9

in the

Having brought the subject

to re-

in

Bay

Commoninto full

served as a catalyst for the formation of Willis-Har-

to insufficient state aid; a school aid distribution

whose

formula that was

was based on "the accident of geographic location"; and a weak Department of Education. Since the state was covering
only 16 percent of the costs of local education, there was an inordinate reliance on the
sixteen years out of date; education

quality

property tax to provide quality education. 10 Further, as a result of using 1945 property
valuations as the basis for determining school aid, towns like Wilmington, with less need,

were receiving $55 per pupil, while cities like Lawrence, with more serious educational
problems, were receiving only $36 for each student." Unless this situation changed, the
series argued, the Commonwealth's municipalities would continue to offer two standards
of education: one where property values were high, another where they were low; and
education, especially in the cities, would suffer.

420,000

city schoolchildren in

Under

this

double-standard system,

Massachusetts were assigned second-class

67

status.

12
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Nor did

the shortcomings in the public school system end at the high school graduation

ceremony, according to the Globe
at its

worst

at the college level,"

13

series. Asserting that "public education in this state is

the authors pointed to the

same lack of coordination

for

college resources which characterized kindergarten through high school. In short, they
said, "public higher education is not really 'a system' but a tangled historic legacy

still

without an overall plan." 14 The absence of direction and coordination meant that schools

were

left to fight

historically

with each other over state resources that the University of Massachusetts

had controlled, and

The Globe

still

did.

15

blame

The efforts of
was so bad that educators were going to the state's private colleges, not to the Department of Education, to
16
learn the current thinking on educational issues. There were no state standards for curprograms
for
career
upgrading
of
teaching
skills, and no overall state plan for
ricula, no
articles did not hesitate to assign

achieving and maintaining quality education for

all

traced the beginnings of this inaction to the 1930s,

became just another haven

all

situation

Massachusetts residents. The articles
when "the Department of Education

for political appointees"; now, in the early 1960s, an often self-

serving "old-boy" network was

was

for these problems.

Department of Education were "inadequate." The

the state

still

in place.

17

Owen Kiernan

Education commissioner

criticized for a lack of leadership, especially concerning curriculum

coordination. Finally, the articles attributed part of the

tion of long standing: there

"mess"

reform and over-

in education to a situa-

had been no statewide review of schooling

for well over a

hundred years, since Horace Mann's term as secretary of the Massachusetts Board of
Education.

The Commission
The mandate of the Willis-Harrington Commission went beyond
tion study in the history of the state:

it

that of

any other educa-

was all-encompassing, involving an analysis of

every aspect of public learning in Massachusetts. The enabling legislation stated that an

"unpaid special commission" was established "for the purpose of making an investigation

and study of the laws of the commonwealth pertaining
institutions of the

therein,

commonwealth and

to education, of the educational

their organization, of the various school systems

and of the educational laws, programs and school systems of other

states."

The

study was to be undertaken "with a view to
elevating educational standards in the

commonwealth, reorganizing the scope of the

various educational boards and administrators of the commonwealth, revising and

modernizing the organizational and financial structure of schools and school systems,
extending the
the

facilities, curricula,

and educational goals of the schools and colleges of

commonwealth, and providing increased

financial aid for education.

18

A major strength of Willis-Harrington was its reliance on a blue-ribbon panel to analyze
education policy in Massachusetts. Seven

members from

the

House and three from the
among them business lead-

Senate were included, as well as eleven distinguished citizens,
ers and school and college administrators.

19

Senate Education Committee chairman Kevin Harrington (D-Salem),

who was on his

becoming one of the most powerful members of the Senate, became chairman of
the commission. House Education Committee chairman Thomas Wojtkowski became the
commission's vice-chairman. Together, Harrington and Wojtkowski created a group that
was comprised mainly of nonpoliticians, an unusual situation in the annals of Massachu-

way

to

68

setts

20
education reform efforts.

Harrington had had lifelong interests in history, government, and education, and, as a

who had depended on scholarship aid for his college education, he
had a firsthand appreciation of the value of learning. His interest in the improvement of
education was no doubt genuine, as was his belief that the commission could be successformer teacher and one

ful.

He was

also politically ambitious.

As one of the rising

leaders in Massachusetts gov-

ernment, he was to be appointed majority leader in 1964 and elected Senate president in
1970. Harrington believed that pulling together a constituency for substantive education

reform would enhance his chances of moving up the

political ladder. Voters in the

were concerned about education, and they would give special consideration
politician

who

to a

1960s

young

cared about the schools.

Benjamin Willis was not a voting member of the commission

but, as

its

executive direc-

was charged with overseeing its day-to-day operations. Willis had presided over the
resurrection of the Chicago school system. As superintendent of Chicago schools, he was

tor,

well-known for his capacity to analyze problems, develop solutions, and drive his
toward implementing those solutions. 21

He was highly

staff

regarded in education circles of the

early 1960s, and his appointment brought a certain star quality to the commission. Har-

rington and Wojtkowski no doubt believed that the prestige and interest generated by Willis's

appointment would help further the commission's work. Willis's credentials were so

impressive that he was chosen as executive director even though he retained his job as

Chicago school superintendent. 22
Beginning in the spring of 1963, six full-time and seven part-time researchers were

They analyzed public education in Massachusetts, collecting data and developing
on a wide variety of topics ranging from school curricula to public funding mechanisms for education. John L. Steele, former superintendent of the U.S. Army
Dependents' Schools in Europe, was the staff director. Examination of the material gener-

hired.

position papers

ated by the researchers indicates the high level of organization Steele brought to the ef-

fort—organization that was

critical to the

success of the commission's research phase.

Steele also stood in for Willis during the week,

when

the executive director

was

in

Chicago. Staff people attended over sixty commission meetings and designed and imple-

mented a major survey on the

logistics of learning (class size, condition of buildings,

curriculum, textbooks, support services) which

more than two hundred school

superin-

tendents filled out and returned.

Findings

The

activity of Willis-Harrington

was divided

into three distinct phases.

The

sixty-seven-

page summary report, with capsule programmatic recommendations, appeared

first;

same time. In the spring
of 1965, the legislature debated the merits of the reform legislation, on the basis of information contained in the summary report; the new board reorganization was signed into
law in June 1965. The massive 624-page final report embraced the recommendations
contained in the summary report but provided more detailed information about the condition of the state's public education. The final report also offered explicit recommendalegislation to reorganize the

tions that addressed the

The findings

Board of Education was

problems identified

in the

filed at the

summary

report.

outlined in the final report would not surprise a student of Massachusetts

education history. They included the following:
•

There was a great disparity

in the

amount of money spent on education

69
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among

the school districts, partly because the state underfunded

aid formula by
•

Some

its

school

50 percent. 23

systems were deficient in curricula offered and in the length of time

required to be spent in academic study. Only 40 percent of the state's high
schools offered their pupils state-of-the-art physics courses, and only 29

percent provided instruction in contemporary calculus. 24
•

The

state's contribution for local

forty-two other states.
•

education costs was lower than that of

25

The Board of Education and

the

Department of Education were "primarily

advisory" and lacked almost every resource necessary for enforcing mini-

mum school standards.
•
•

No

statewide

The

and school

libraries varied widely

27

among

dis-

28

• Special

and vocational education programs were not meeting the needs of

students.

The

existed for measuring school performance.

quality of textbooks

tricts.

•

means

26

29

public higher education system was ill-prepared to meet either the

immediate needs of the growing population of college-age students or the
long-range needs of the Massachusetts economy.

The

30

report went beyond listing these individual findings,

forth in previous studies.

31

Over

fifty

many of which had been

problems of certain school populations, including minorities, the handicapped, and
dents

who did not speak English.

set

pages were devoted to a consideration of the special
stu-

In the education system, black citizens were dispropor-

They "were forced to live by themselves" in cities where
in evidence. And, in keeping with its overall thrust, the
report stated that learning would help disadvantaged citizens move up the social and economic ladders upon which Americans placed so much stock. 32
The report gravely concluded that many of the state's local school districts were proving shortsighted in their treatment of education, which they viewed as merely a budget
33
item, not as a "gilt-edge investment" in a better future. Despite the benefits of good
education for all, "the bulk of the Commonwealth's cities and towns put into schooling
what money they could afford to spend, not what they could afford to invest." 34 This circumstance was a fundamental concern of the report: "It matters vitally to every individual
where the accident of birth and home locates him. And the very fact that it does should
matter more than anything else in Massachusetts." 35

tionately the victims of poverty.

quality public education

was not

Major Recommendation
The commission's key proposal was

to reorganize the existing

Board of Education

into

Board of Public School Education and a Board of Higher Education. These new governing units were to be filled by appointees who were not educators—
a clear repudiation of the old Board of Education, which had been staffed exclusively by
two

distinct entities, a

school professionals.

The old Board of Education had assumed

responsibility for elementary, secondary, and

70

postsecondary schools, but the two new boards were to divide responsibility. The Board
of Public School Education would govern kindergarten through high school; the second

board would administer higher education.

The Board of Public School Education. Once the old Board of Education had been
solved as part of the June 1965 legislation, the

name. The new
be

in

new

structure

became known by

BOE was composed of outstanding Massachusetts citizens

dis-

same
who were to
the

charge of setting education policy for the elementary and secondary schools. All

aspects of learning at these levels, including education of the handicapped, special needs,

and vocational training, were within the purview of the BOE. Before the reorganization,
separate divisions in the Department of Education had set policy in these areas, often

without considering

how

the plans of a particular division

education system. The broadening of power in the

would

new BOE,

fit

then,

into the state's overall

was expected

to bring

greater efficiency to the setting of education policy.

The

BOE that was created by the

the authority to set

minimum

1965 law was given new statutory powers, including

educational standards for

all

teacher ratios; evaluate the state school-aid formula and

courses; fix

maximum pupil-

recommend changes; and

with-

hold state and federal funds from school committees that failed to comply with laws or
regulations that

it

promulgated. The

BOE chairman was the chief spokesman for school

improvement; he and his board would work with the legislature
to carry out specific programs. In short, the

for

to secure the funds

new Board of Education was

to

needed

be the vehicle

implementing the commission's programmatic reforms.

The Board of Higher Education. This body was created
to the state's

system of postsecondary

institutions. It

was

to bring order

to

mission of new institutions, allocate resources effectively, and

was also

to act as a buffer

between the

institutions

and the

and organization

determine the location and
set

program

legislature,

priorities. It

determine the fund-

ing levels for individual campuses, and oversee the expansion of the state's public higher

education system.

The previous Board of Education had been given little in the way of support staff. To
this ill, the new governance boards were to be supported by a nongoverning research arm, the Massachusetts Advisory Council on Education (MACE). While not a

remedy

policy-making unit per
ters,

se,

MACE would act as a standing committee on educational mat-

with the professional demeanor and research capabilities to monitor the education

process in Massachusetts.
to the

new

It

would also screen candidates

for gubernatorial

appointment

BOE and the BHE.

The Commission 's Price Tag
The commission diffused much of the potential argument

against the cost of the reform by

not incorporating programmatic recommendations in the legislative package that was

signed into law in June 1965. The final report detailed 111 suggestions for improvement,
but only those which the

new boards authorized would be pursued. With two boards

in-

would increase by several hundreds of thousands of
was the probable extent of immediate increased costs. The price tag

stead of one, administrative costs
dollars, but that

seemed acceptable

for the benefits that

would be delivered.

A few critics,

Joseph Brett (D-Quincy)— a commission

member— and Sen.

voiced concern about cost, but there was

little

sion's likely effect

on the taxpayer. 36

71

such as Rep.

William Wall (D-Lawrence)

concerted objection regarding the commis-
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Legislative Proposals
Legislation reorganizing the governance of public education was filed in

coincident with the release of the

was

state's legislative leadership

summary

The

little

governance boards and remarkably

matic agenda of the commission. In

and was committed

immediate public opposition
little initial

fact, in

December 1964,
The

reaction was largely positive.

solidly behind the study

major recommendation. There was
tion

report.

to the

to passing

its

new educa-

opposition to the extensive program-

1965, optimism abounded concerning the

commission's proposals. The media (especially the Boston Globe, which was establishing

up-and-coming paper of the decade) were highly supportive, as were most
(A notable exception to this favorable response was Owen Kiernan, who was
commissioner of the Board of Education that preceded Willis-Harrington— and no relaitself as the

educators.

Cornelius Kiernan, another

tive of Rep.

critic.)

37

In the mid-1960s, teachers' unions

were

not major players in the formulation of public policy, so their voices were generally absent

from the commentary on Willis-Harrington. 38
Yet, from today's perspective, it would seem that the commission's ambitions exceeded
its grasp of political reality. Reading through the 624-page final report, with its detailed
analyses and recommendations, gives the reader a sense that, if only because of sheer
volume,

education manifesto could never have been realized. Very probably, in the

this

latter part

of the 1980s, any knowledgeable observer of the history of education in the

Commonwealth— a history based on
weak

traditionally

state

almost autonomous local control of the schools and a

Department of Education— would view the commission's agenda

with serious skepticism. Clearly, there was a contradiction between the commission's
expectations and what

The
to

implement

its

it

could realistically hope to accomplish.

commission experienced

difficulty the

agenda can be attributed

in motivating the political

to five

major

factors.

and

civic cultures

These include the shifting

of the social agenda; the legacy of strong local control of schools in Massachusetts; the
failure of the state to

weaknesses

The

earmark money

in leadership;

Shifting of the

implement the commission's recommendations;
legislative prerogatives.

Agenda

The explanation of the
plishments

to

and traditional

contradiction between the goals of the commission and

lies partly in

the

more general

its

accom-

The years 1962 and 1963
Unemployment and inflation were

historical context.

were heady times in Massachusetts and in the nation.
under control, and personal income was rising steadily. 39 John F. Kennedy's administration had stirred much hope. The pragmatic rationalism that characterized the president's
tenure held that with the right kind of research, planning, and commitment, anything
could be accomplished. 40 The United States was a solid contender in the space race, and
the president

had pledged

to land

an American on the

moon before the decade's

end.

Education had been a major issue in Kennedy's campaign platform, and he had made

comprehensive education reform one of his

legislative goals.

Massachusetts was experiencing good times.

41

A son of the Bay State was in the White

House. Thirty thousand children a year were entering the

state's school system. If the

moon, Massachusetts could certainly be on its way to
providing educational excellence for all. Kevin Harrington, Benjamin Willis, and their
allies could reasonably believe that the state would be the driving force that would ensure
United States was on

its

way

to the

this excellence.

72

However, both the

when
sion

the

state

and the nation changed dramatically between 1962 and the time

new Board of Education became

was beginning

to develop

its

fully operational, in 1967. Just as the

research, John

F.

Kennedy was

commis-

assassinated, an event

dampened the kind of idealism in which Willis-Harrington was conceived. Part of
Lyndon Johnson's legacy included the Great Society, which sent billions of federal dollars
to the states to combat poverty and improve education. By the mid-1960s, the arena for
social progress and improvement of schools had shifted dramatically— to Washington,
away from state and local government. The year 1965 brought race riots to some cities and
an escalation of the war in Vietnam, while less attention was paid to state education initiathat

tives.

As

the decade

on the

state

wore on

in

Massachusetts, improvement of schools lost

indicating that elementary and secondary education

monwealth's children. Feared shortages

were

built to

The same
lation

remedy

in teachers

urgent status

were doing a good job with the Comnever materialized, and new schools

the double-shift school days of the early decade.

legislative session that

had passed the Willis-Harrington reorganization

had also passed the Massachusetts Racial Imbalance

norities better
in 1963, the

its

agenda. Tens of thousands of baby boomers swelled college enrollments,

became

Bill,

and how

the lead school issue. Martin Luther King's

to educate

legis-

mi-

march on Washington

passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Watts riots and the Selma march

of 1965, and the numerous race riots of 1966 and 1967

all

helped create a heightened

national awareness of racial inequality. In Massachusetts in 1965, political leaders passed
a progressive racial imbalance law that

of the ironies of this era

is

that actions

was designed

aimed

at

to desegregate public schools.

promoting

42

One

racial equality essentially con-

signed to the back burner efforts to improve public education.

Problems related

to desegregation interfered with the

Willis-Harrington's master plan.
lative

Two months

new BOE's

after passage of the

ability to

implement

commission's

legis-

package, the legislature enacted the Racial Imbalance Law. For Willis-Harrington

supporters,

it

was an unfortunate coincidence

that

two of the most important education

became law in the same session. Owing to the preoccupation
with redressing racial imbalance in some urban systems (Boston and Springfield primarily), less energy was focused on the general quality of education in the late 1960s. A content analysis of the newspapers of the period shows that more than 80 percent of the
reportage on education dealt with issues of racial balance. 43 Even allowing for press bias,
bills in the state's history

that figure is a telling indicator.

From the beginning, Harrington had insisted that the commission consider the problem
44
From its inception, however, the new BOE was

of segregation in the public schools.

consumed with

By

trying to redress the racial imbalance without offending any constituency.

1967, given the overriding racial issue and start-up problems that

still

persisted, the

BOE could find little time to work on the more general problems of public education in
Massachusetts. 45

By

1973, the board was

still

being criticized for neglecting the needs of

white parents because of its preoccupation with the Racial Imbalance Law. 46

What was believed probable in 1962, with respect
seemed impossible five years later.

to the Willis-Harrington agenda,

The Tenacity of Local Control
Local control of education, which
Massachusetts.

is

a strong national tradition,

Among the industrial

states,

Massachusetts

73

is

very pronounced in

may be the most locally

ori-

New England Journal of Public Policy

ented concerning education.

47

Historically,

has paid a relatively low percentage of the

it

becomes

cost of education. In the absence of substantial state aid, support of schools
largely a local responsibility, and the corollary

is

local control. Massachusetts has

few

state-imposed course requirements (just four years of physical education and one year of
history) and

no

state standards for

graduation from high school. Those

who would reform

education in the Bay State, then, have always searched for some way to do so without

offending the sensibilities of municipalities.

Early statutes helped establish the preeminence of the locality

and a glance backward

to the formative days of

in

matters of education,

Massachusetts can help explain the devel-

opment of municipal power. The Puritans who settled communities like Dedham— whose
roots have been researched at length— had rigid, hierarchical concepts of religion and
government— indeed, of life generally. Outsiders were not welcome, and each newly
established town was expected to be largely self-sufficient. Calvinist theology taught that
any failure to succeed indicated a spiritual flaw, so there was little likelihood that a community would admit to any problems and ask others for help, no matter how badly needed
that help might be. Such a request would have been tantamount to admitting a weakness of
48
faith, an admission that people were loath to make.
Even as the state's towns and cities evolved, the belief in self-sufficiency remained
powerful. The early settlers had left England to escape the intrusion of central power into
their lives,

New

an intrusion that forbade their religious practices. Subsequent generations of

Englanders prided themselves on their independence from government.

education

came

to the state, control

force of tradition.

The

early

was kept

When public

municipal level through the powerful

at the

Board of Education could only suggest policy

to local sys-

tems, so success "depended less on the pleasure of the legislature in session than on the
persuasiveness of the Secretary sitting

down with

local school committees."

Harrington's participants discovered, the hold of local control was

still

49

As

Willis-

very firm.

The new BOE did not make substantive recommendations affecting local districts until
November 1967, fully seventeen months after its creation. In a move designed to make
public education more efficient, the board issued guidelines for reducing the number of
school districts in the state from 390 to 250. At the same time, it recommended a teacherstudent ratio of

1

to

25 for elementary school and

Once the new governing body had

to 16.7 for high school.

1

50

actually set forth substantive recommendations,

resistance developed rapidly. Criticism

was levied

at the

commission

for having presented

proposals in the absence of any cost projections. Further, the findings of the commission

which justified these recommendations had not been adequately publicized, especially
with respect to the school districts that would implement them. Local school personnel
felt

The Boston Herald,
was particularly concerned about the new

they had not been given an adequate opportunity to provide input.

the establishment newspaper of the period,

BOE 's actions:
Even

the

most progressive school committeemen tend

board takes two of the most important reform actions

to

be bewildered when the

in the history of

education in the same day, and then provides few hard facts as to

how

Massachusetts
these reforms

may be implemented. 51
Officials in forty communities

were petitioning the

legislature in protest of another

mission recommendation, one mandating that kindergarten be available in

The negative response by school

districts to these initial

52

programmatic recommendations

indicated that implementing any major reforms would be difficult.

74

com-

all districts.

Willis-Harrington did not aim to set up a rigid, centralized school system. 53 In his

speech before the 1965 Tufts Assembly, commission
sured local officials that the

new system would

member Franklin

Patterson reas-

not mandate programs, but merely "set up

a floor beneath which educational services cannot

fall."

54

Those associated with

Willis-

Harrington continually asserted that the recommendations would not change the power of
the local school board to control education.

would be required merely
have to increase
this

was a

tall

its

to

The commission maintained

meet certain minimums, yet

number of teachers by

order that threatened

its

that districts

for a school system that

would

15 percent or budget in kindergarten facilities,

sacrosanct autonomy.

The new boards of education were intended as vehicles to shape education policy and
bring more state resources into the classroom. Clearly, this constituted a shifting of
power. Though the commission as a whole tried to understate the impact its agenda would
have on local control— and probably believed that the impact could be absorbed— local
districts, feeling that changes were being imposed upon them and that they were not included as partners in the process, were predisposed to reject the agenda. The commission's selection of understatement as a strategy
districts as a

Failure to

local school

Earmark State Aid

More than 90 percent of the commission's
problems

was ultimately perceived by

kind of deliberate betrayal.

in the schools

and

final report

suggesting solutions.

was devoted

to identifying specific

Such suggestions included hiring more

teachers to lower the student-teacher ratio, upgrading the quality and currency of text-

books, improving the physical plants of schools, and doubling state aid to local school
districts.

Willis-Harrington itself estimated the total cost of putting

its

new programs

in

place at $123 million, 55 while Rep. Cornelius Kiernan argued that the cost would exceed

$215 million. 56
If the state

was

to obtain

more

control over local education, Massachusetts political

leaders would have to appropriate

more money

to

implement the new board's agenda.

was supported by Governor Volpe passed in November
1967. While there was clearly no quid pro quo linking the levy to Willis-Harrington, the
tax was on the public policy agenda during the mid-1960s, and this was seen by some as

The

legislation for a sales tax that

an indication that

it

could be used as a funding mechanism for education reform. The

governor had referred to the sales levy as an "education tax." But there was a general
consensus that in the absence of strong leadership from the

would be used to reduce real

estate taxes or

BOE, any new

state

revenues

expand other local services besides education. 57

Since state education aid was not earmarked for education, increased local aid would
not necessarily go to the schools. After the state sales tax was voted into law, local aid
increased, but

Even

many

districts did not

after Willis-Harrington's

major institutionalized increase

apply the

work and
in the

new revenue toward education expenses.
new boards, there was no

the creation of the

percentage share that the state contributed for local

education. 58

Local autonomy was a determining factor here as well. Municipalities want to retain
control over their budgets, including whatever state revenues they receive. Further, the

new

BOE had not yet developed a strong presence with the state's educational and politiby the time the new sales tax was in place. A third problem was the steady

cal institutions

stream of federal dollars that came into Massachusetts and other states during the middle

and

late 1960s.

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA)

75

targeted
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federal aid to poor children and brought tens of millions of dollars of federal

the

Commonwealth

in the

second half of the decade. With

there was less incentive for political leaders to consider earmarking
aid.

59

In

dedicate

its

second year of operation, the

money

this federal largesse in

more

into

hand,

education

state

BOE was unable to move the political process to

new revenue toward some of the more

basic Willis-Harrington recommendations.

The Problem of Leadership
The major leadership problem faced by

the

new boards may have revolved around the
in the state. Though solidly

people that Governor Volpe appointed to oversee education
respected in their

own

had

fields, the appointees

little

or no experience in public educa-

tion or in Massachusetts political life. Their lack of exposure to the realities of

Massachu-

setts politics

proved to be a serious obstacle as they attempted to overcome the tenacity of

local control

and other institutionalized resistance

to educational change.

The BOE Chairman
The chairman of the new Board of Education was William G. Saltonstall, a former principal of Exeter Academy and past head of the Peace Corps in Nigeria. Contemporaries of
Saltonstall generally had nothing but praise for his integrity and sincerity, but he seemed
to lack a realistic appreciation of the political process required to

improve the

state's

public education, and this proved detrimental in three significant areas: the board's relationship with the state legislators;
posals; and

its

its

attitude

toward publicizing and marketing

estimation of local control as a counterforce to

During an interview

its

in July 1966, Saltonstall reported that the

its

pro-

own power.

BOE had not yet had

time to meet with the state legislators and build a foundation of trust. At the same time, he

complained

that progress

was slow because all personnel recommendations had to be
Ways and Means Committee. 61 Yet six months had passed

cleared through the legislature's

Governor Volpe 's appointments, and during

since

this time,

board members had

failed to

connect with the legislators in charge of funding and personnel oversight. Saltonstall was
discouraged about the lack of progress and about the unwillingness of the legislature to
trust

and consult with the board he headed. 62

With respect to the issue of local autonomy, Saltonstall believed that "the mandated
power of the board recommending directly to school districts" would be enough to ensure
change. He also thought that local school committees, superintendents, and principals
were "enthusiastic" about the Willis-Harrington study and "eager

sume

its

authority."

63

By

1967, the board's

initial

to see [the

BOE]

as-

recommendations had been publicized,

but the times had changed and they were met with a negative response. Saltonstall' s apparent naivete about local control

may have

led

him

to underestimate the

importance of a

marketing strategy for the board's proposals. In any case, when he was confronted with
the observation that during

its first

year of existence the board had not developed a posi-

tive

image, he replied that he did not consider developing public relations to be part of his

job.

64

This attitude reflected perhaps the ultimate failure of leadership

among

the ranks of

Willis-Harrington advocates: they did not understand that marketing their recommendations

was a

critical first step

toward bringing about change. The following year,

in

Novem-

ber 1967, the board's recommendation to decrease the student-teacher ratio was attacked
at least in part

because local

The message had
tion system

to

districts

be delivered

would be beneficial,

if

had not been adequately informed about the proposal.

to the public that costly

changes in the

state's

educa-

not essential, to the continued prosperity of the

76

Com-

monwealth. In the absence of a major effort
unable to develop the broad backing that

to focus public opinion, the

new

BOE was

systemic education reforms required.

BOE Commissioner

The

Owen

Kiernan's job as commissioner of the prior Board of Education had been eliminated

in the reorganization, but

new

when

the votes

were counted, he was the commissioner of the

board. This was curious, in that Mr. Kiernan clearly was not comfortable with the

conclusions of Willis-Harrington.
at

its

Kiernan and

The 1961 Globe

series

had leveled

and much of the evidence

his bureaucracy,

charges primarily

its

for the series

had been provided

by the commission. In December 1964, when the summary report was issued, Commissioner Kiernan had been openly skeptical about the possibility of implementing the

recommendation to eliminate the old Board of
Education, calling the idea "indefensible." 65 Commission vice-chairman Wojtkowski
described Kiernan as a "survivor" who, while having little use for Willis-Harrington,
study's objectives and had criticized

would not jeopardize

his tenure

its

by being too

critical

of the effort viewed by

many

as the

most significant attempt to improve education. 60
Owen Kiernan generally supported the idea of Massachusetts education reform. His

state's

chief objection to Willis-Harrington was that

who had

it

infringed on the legislative prerogative, 67

followed the progress of the study, this reservation was puzzling.

and

to

The

object of this reform effort, in the words of Thomas Wojtkowski, was to keep the state

anyone

legislature

from being a "school committee of the whole"

boards were to be given enough power

provements

in

for the state.

process to

in the political

make

68

The two new

substantive im-

Massachusetts education, and the new structure would ensure that public

school policy would be based

more on rational education theory than on politically driven
some agreement with the ends but not with the means.

considerations. Kiernan was in

With the

clarity of hindsight,

seems absurd

it

that a

major

of the Willis-Harring-

critic

ton recommendations would be chosen to lead the drive to implement them. In April

1967, the Globe noted that

many

observers, surprised

when Kiernan was

kept on,

felt that

"past weaknesses of the Department would not find correction under past leadership."

69

The Board of Higher Education
As with the new BOE, start-up problems sapped the energy of the Board of Higher Education. The search that resulted in the decision to hire Chancellor Winthrop Dakin, a respected Amherst attorney, took over a year. The actual governance of public higher
education in Massachusetts was just as disjointed with this new board in place as it had
been before, and by the mid-1970s Kevin Harrington and other
looking to replace the

political leaders

were

BHE. 70

Perhaps the biggest problem for the BHE was that the established institutions of higher
education— the University of Massachusetts, Lowell Tech, and Southeastern Massachusetts

Technological Institute in particular— still had powerful allies on Beacon Hill. An-

other problem was that the
trustees

new board had to compete with

who oversaw the segments

state colleges, the technical institutions,

in setting policy.

five already existing boards of

of public higher education (the community colleges,

and the University of Massachusetts

The new board's leadership could not overcome

established relationships between legislators and lobbyists, and so

hopes of its sponsors,
Like other

who had

was unable

sought to create a strong, independent body.

states in the nation,

higher education

facilities in the

at

Amherst)

the politics of longto fulfill the

71

Massachusetts experienced dramatic growth in public
1960s; the baby

77

boom had increased the demand for
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higher education. The
before the

BHE's

and building

BHE was rarely a major player in this dynamic.

Just as they

had

creation in 1965, the legislature and the campuses determined policy

priorities.

72

The Governor
government

Historically, the decentralized character of state

in

Massachusetts has pre-

cluded the development of a powerful governor's office. Until 1966, possibly because of a
colonial aversion to a strong executive, Massachusetts governors served two-year terms.

As

a result, they generally spent the second year running for reelection rather than

ing on policy issues.

73

Between

War II and

the end of World

work-

the enactment in 1966 of the

law setting a four-year term, voters never kept a governor of the same party in office for

more than
power.

74

four years, so the executive had

little

opportunity to exert partisan political

Thus, the office occupied by John Volpe from 1965

until

1969 was relatively

weak.

Governor Volpe did not stand

way of implementing

directly in the

agenda, but his support was tempered by his concern about

summary

report issued in

Christmas present." 75
said the job

December 1964, he

make

the

cost.

the Willis-Harrington

Commenting on

the

referred to the plan's price tag as "hardly a

When the reorganization

legislation

was only half done and reiterated the need

education to

its

new governance machinery

was signed

in

June 1965, he

to infuse millions of dollars into

function well.

76

Like most people, Governor Volpe believed that the improvement of public education

was a worthy goal, but he did not make increased funding
priorities. In

dred million dollars

and towns

mended

in the

one of his

revenue over and above existing programs to our

that the legislature

cities

elementary and secondary education as recom-

Harrington- Willis Study Commission Report." 77 The governor

been anticipating

and since

in additional

for the support of local public

that did not

for local education

January 1966, he wrongly asserted that "the state was providing one hun-

would include

this

money

in the

FY

may have

1967 budget, but

happen. Since he was relatively restrained in his reaction to Willis-Harrington,

his office lacked the clout

we have come

to expect

from contemporary governors,

Volpe 's capacity to help realize the goals of the commission was rather limited.

The Majority Leader

From 1962

to 1965,

Kevin Harrington was the chief spokesman for the commission's

work, and throughout the effort his enthusiasm and commitment were obvious. Yet even
Harrington grew frustrated with repeated efforts to persuade the legislature and the public to

make

the necessary

choices— especially

in

terms of spending money.

During 1966 and 1967, as Harrington began to doubt the new system's capacity to
implement the educational master plan, his enthusiasm waned. In much of the post- 1965
coverage of the commission's aftermath, his voice was conspicuously absent.

was

cited,

he was frequently

critical

When he

new boards. In October
that the new BOE had failed to

of the performance of the

1966, Harrington noted a growing belief on Beacon Hill

create the necessary "groundswell of public support" for increased aid to public education.

78

for the

Several months

later,

he said that "the legislature has failed

to

develop respect

new boards of education. Neither the boards' recommendations

nor requests for appropriations have been heeded." 79
tional culture of the state, with

its

resistance to change, as he

structure.

78

for

programs

He was as critical of the educawas of the new governance

own political agenda. Since no new constitucommission's
around
the
proposals, he could not afford to make the
ency had developed
his
priority.
He
had
local
schools
been appointed Senate majority leader
improvement of
Harrington also was concerned about his

With the road to the Senate presidency apparently ahead of him, developing the
external constituency needed to implement the plan he helped craft became less important.
in 1964.

The

Legislative Prerogative

For many years prior

had been a major force in Massachusetts
Board
of
Education
was reputed to be independent, the
public education. Although the old
to 1965, the legislature

commission pointed to the absence of a strong, central policy-making body in the education
system which was not subject to control by the highly politicized legislature. In theory,
making education less of a political football made good sense, but it was unlikely that the
Massachusetts legislature would readily give up the control

maintained over public

it

schooling.

According

to

commission vice-chairman Thomas Wojtkowski, changes made by the
to the reform legislation weakened the new structure and

Ways and Means Committee

helped ensure the legislature's continued involvement in education. These included

alter-

some of the language of the legislation and limiting the salaries of the new boards'
leadership. The salaries of the BOE commissioner and the BHE chancellor were reduced
from $35,000 to $30,000, and, more important, the stipends were made subject to appro80
priation. With relatively low salaries locked in place, the new boards would have difficulty hiring top-flight administrators, and the committee removed one of the board's
independent powers by making salaries contingent upon appropriation.
More significant was the alteration of language. The commission's proposal in Deceming

ber 1964 called for the
bill

BOE to

had moved through the

"approve

all

plans for public school education."

legislative process, the

new law

said the

BOE

81

After the

"shall develop

plans for education to meet state needs," with no mention of any power to approve activities

of local districts. 82 Thus the power of the

curtailed,

and

While the

its

role

was reduced

to

new

structure to initiate or direct

was greatly

an advisory one.

legislative leadership (Kevin Harrington,

Maurice Donahue, and House

Speaker John Davoren) had consistently trumpeted the work of Willis-Harrington, the
floor fight on the commission's proposal revealed that

many

legislators

about the reorganization. Several amendments to weaken the proposed

had reservations

BOE by

splitting

of f vocational education and special education gained solid support before being defeated.

The key

vote

came on an amendment

to reject the

commission's

bill entirely

and modify

cation.

Department of Education by adding a separate division for special needs eduThat failed by only eight votes, 1 10 to 102. A shift of five votes would have scut-

tled the

commission's key recommendation

the current

to establish

an all-powerful board

to

run

public education. 83

Although

legislative leadership

and the Willis-Harrington Commission agreed

change was needed, the legislature as a body was more cautious. After

and writing had been completed, lawmakers
local education to a

new bureaucracy.

still

Individual

local school districts than did their leaders or the

were reluctant

all

to yield their

members had more

that

the research

power over

routine contact with

commission's members, a

fact that

may

have contributed to the legislature's unwillingness to accept fully the education proposal.
In the spring of 1967, criticism

was leveled

at the legislature for

79

undercutting the power of

New England Journal of Public Policy

new boards and obstructing the boards' requests for appropriations. 84 This should not
have been surprising; many members of the House and Senate were not comfortable with
the

creating the strong boards envisioned by the commission.

Evaluation

Where does

Willis-Harrington

efforts? In a

narrow sense,

it

fit in

the hierarchy of Massachusetts education reform

did not do what

it

set out to do.

The new Board of Education

never became the powerful initiator of school policy that the commission had intended

it

Twenty years after Willis-Harrington, a management study on the board and the
Department of Education concluded that the BOE should "take steps to assert leadership,
to be.

clarify

sion."

its

governance

and promote a consistent approach

role,

The study went on

to

recommend that the board develop

to carrying out its mis-

a coherent statement of

mission. 85

Most of the
•

The

final report's

major programmatic recommendations were not implemented:

aid formula for state reimbursement of local education

funded and would not be

worked

until 1978,

to enact a short-lived progressive funding

cut by Proposition 2 Vi

was not

fully

when another legislative commission
formula that was under-

86
,

Willis-Harrington did not persuade the Commonwealth's political leaders
to

fund 40 percent of local education costs in order to decrease reliance on

the property tax to pay for the schools. Thus, the
to equalize per-pupil expenditures

and towns. In

among

commission was not able

the poorer and wealthier cities

by 1969, fully four years after Willis-Harrington had

fact,

been released, the disparity

in educational expenditures

had widened, and

by 1978 the gap was even worse. 87

New

state

revenues were not earmarked specifically for local elementary

and secondary education

costs.

The hope was

leadership from the reconstituted

BOE,

local

that with the appropriate

governments would use new

revenues for education reform without the need for earmarking, a constraint that municipalities vigorously oppose. In the final analysis, the

legacy of local control took on the coloration of a moral imperative when-

ever the

new board

structure attempted to assert independent leadership.

Statewide measures were not imposed to assess school performance. (They
were established much later, with the passage of Chapter 188 of the Acts of
1985.)

The

disparity

between the resources and offerings of poor (usually urban)

and wealthy school

among

minority students.

The

districts

these districts

is

remained

intact.

Today, student performance

increasingly divergent, particularly with respect to

88

overall student-teacher ratio has declined dramatically since the mid-

1960s, but the decline

is

due primarily

80

to the

appearance of bilingual and

who often

special needs teachers,

serve small classrooms. There certainly

has not been the sort of increase in state funding that would permit districts

enough teachers

to hire

Given these programmatic

to

lower the ratio for general education. 89

shortfalls,

it

clear that the structural changes signed into

is

law in June 1965 did not transform the Massachusetts Board of Education into the equivalent of a powerful

body

like the

New York Board of Regents.
Commission exceeded

the impact of the Willis-Harrington

Yet, in a historical context,

that of any of the

or so other education reform efforts that preceded or followed

one hundred

it.

Certainly the largest effort in terms of scope, budget, and time frame, the commission

much to improve public

did

education in Massachusetts.

bish atmosphere.

And it

moved those

By opening up membership

in

away from a closed, clubdid focus the media's and the public's attention on the schools

the boards of education to lay people,

it

structures

during the mid-1960s.
In light of the

Harrington
the

is

BHE's

ineffectiveness

remembered by many

words of Joseph Cronin, former

(it

for

was dissolved

what

it

in 1980),

it is

ironic that Willis-

did to promote public higher education. In

state secretary

of educational affairs, Willis-Harrington

"liberated the state colleges" and helped increase the likelihood that a Massachusetts high

school graduate could go on to public higher education. 90

Willis-Harrington helped expand the state's higher education by publicizing the educa-

and by splitting of f governance of postsecondary learning from that of general
The previous Board of Education had often sought to advance personal gain at
expense of institutional growth. The new, independent governance provided an in-

tion system

education.
the

creased sense of legitimacy and credibility to the state's colleges and universities as a separate piece of the educational landscape.

The commission's work also helped

publicize the

range of offerings of the state system. In the early 1970s, community colleges became an
important part of public higher education, in part because of the commission's conclusion
that

expanded educational opportunities were important

to the future

growth of the

state.

Willis-Harrington slightly increased the amount of money that state reimbursed localities.

In

what

is

one of the ironies of tax-policy development

in Massachusetts, the

com-

mission probably helped bring about the imposition of the Massachusetts sales tax. Un-

was passed too late to infuse money
BOE's education proposals. The perception that much of the new revenue would
be used to pay for education reform probably made it much easier to sell the tax to the
legislature and to the public. Although most of the new money was not used to improve
schools, the sales tax, which many would argue is an essential general revenue enchancefortunately for the commission's advocates, the tax

into the

91

ment device

for Massachusetts,

is still

in effect today,

and the commission can be credited

at least in part with its passage.

The commission's
unable to implement

greatest contribution, however,
its

ambitious agenda,

it

helped

is

an intangible: although

set the context for

it

was

many reforms

that

followed. In the twenty years since Willis-Harrington, the state local aid formula has been

made more

progressive; special needs students have been given the opportunity to receive

a quality public education; numerous school buildings have been upgraded and replaced;
bilingual education has

become

a reality; and teacher certification has been modernized.

All these reforms were suggested in the commission's final report, and

assume

that they

were easier

to

reform. Proponents of those efforts are in
the Willis-Harrington

it is

reasonable to

implement because of Willis-Harrington's clarion

Commission

some

large

measure indebted

for their later successes.

81

call for

to the efforts of
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Conclusion

The experience of the Willis-Harrington Commission
that attends education

reform efforts

illustrates the essential

in Massachusetts.

On the one hand,

ambivalence

leaders call for

change; more than one hundred education studies have been authorized with education

reform

in

mind. 92

On the other hand, many people feel that local autonomy

a critical

is

value that should not be assaulted. Civic and political leaders see a need for improving

many

of the state's school systems in the important areas of curriculum, teaching, and

basic skills; but

many

resent the state telling local districts to

Sometimes we clamor for more state education
became involved in local education at all.
Twenty years

after the

aid.

make changes

in these areas.

At other times we rue the day the

commission went out of business, much of its agenda

is still

state

the

subject of reform activities. Educators and politicians are concerned about the disparity in
the caliber of education offered in the local districts; of particular concern are the high

dropout rates and the poor

test results that attend

urban systems. 93 Equalizing educational

is a worthy goal, but one that seems to elude us.
Those who work to improve the schools must pay attention

opportunity

to past efforts to

advance

education. Without an external constituency for change, good ideas will remain theoretical.

Willis-Harrington demonstrated that doing just about everything right in the research

and

legislative phases of school

constructive change.
tion of local

improvement

efforts

is

probably not enough to promote

The commission's agenda was thwarted by

control— and by the

the

old— the

strong tradi-

new— the ascendance of other priorities.

In summarizing the frustrations of the Willis-Harrington effort, Kevin Harrington said

much about the process of Massachusetts education

reform:

We enacted what we wanted to enact. We ripped layers of skin off the old system,
in a

few years, the education establishment came right back

in.

but

94

Harrington's observation points out the essential problem for those

who would try

to

reform education. Being given the legal sanction to make decisions about education policy
is

not equivalent to having the power to change anything. In order to bring change to the

system, reformers must realize that power
taken.

New

is

perhaps 20 percent granted and 80 percent

laws replaced the old Board of Education with two

new boards, but the

foun-

dation needed to capture the attention of the public and the political culture— a necessary

who wish to wield power in a representative democracy— was never laid.
Not understanding the enormity of their task, the leaders of the new governance structure
were unable to change the face of Massachusetts public education.
Perhaps more than anything else, the history of the Willis-Harrington Commission
demonstrates that those who wish to reform education in Massachusetts must recognize
the difficulty of changing the basic relationship between weak, centralized state power
step for those

and autonomous

knowledge

that

local control.

The Willis-Harrington researchers

felt

encouraged by the

Massachusetts cared enough about education to have authorized so many

studies.

Perhaps that piece of history should have been taken as a warning that

chusetts

we

prefer to initiate reform studies instead of improving education.

in

The

Massastate's

penchant for studying rather than reforming public education made the commission's task
very difficult, and

its

successes quite impressive.
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Notes
secondary source material is available regarding the Willis-Harrington Commission;
on this subject must utilize primary source documents and interviews with
participants. Fortunately, the work of the commission is well documented, both in terms of legislative
materials and staff working papers and newspaper accounts, most of which are available at the
Massachusetts State Library, State House, Boston.

Remarkably

little

therefore, a researcher

1

summary report was Quality Education for Massachusetts: An Investment
Commonwealth: Summary Report of the Massachusetts Special Commission Relative to Improving and Extending Educational Facilities in the Commonwealth (Boston,
1964). The title of the final report was Special Commission to Investigate and Study Educational
Facilities in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Boston, 1965).

The
in

2.

actual

title

of the

the People of the

E. Marsh, "A Study of Massachusetts Studies of Education," unpublished working paper,
Massachusetts Education Study Collection, Massachusetts State Archives, Dorchester, Mass., 27

Paul

November

1963.

3.

United States Census, 1960.

4.

General Court, Special Commission to Investigate and Study Educational Facilities (1965), 60.

5.

Ibid.

6.

7.

Ian Menzies, member of the Hingham School Committee in the 1960s, former education writer
and columnist, Boston Globe; interview, Dorchester, Mass., 13 August 1985.

Franklin Patterson,

member of the Willis-Harrington Commission;

The fear of a teacher shortage proved

1985.
8.

Boston Herald, 28 October 1962,

9.

Ian

Forman and

Ian Menzies,

interview, Boston, 17

August

to be largely unfounded.

18.

"The Mess

in

Bay State Education" (Boston: Boston Globe Corporaappeared in the Boston Globe, 21-28 September

tion, 1961). Reprint of a series of articles that

1961.
10.

Ibid., 4.

11.

Ibid.

12.

Ibid., 21.

13.

Ibid., 2.

14.

Ibid., 16.

15.

Ibid., 10.

16.

Ibid., 21.

17.

Ibid., 2;

Thomas Wojtkowski>

interview, Boston, 19
1

8.

19.

vice-chairman of the Willis-Harrington Commission, 1962-65;

June 1985.

General Court, Special Commission to Investigate and Study Educational Facilities
Ibid.;

the

names

of the

commission members are

20. Historically, education reform

elected

officials,

commissions

in

listed

on pages 6 and 7 of the

(1

965), 8.

report.

Massachusetts have been comprised mainly of

with a minority of nonpolitician appointees. See note 31 for typical commis-

sions.

21

Boston Globe, 12 January 1963,

7.

was technically a consultant to the reform
weekends and on days off from his job in Chicago.

22. Mr. Willis

23. General Court, Special

Commission

to Investigate

83

effort.

He commuted

to Boston regularly on

and Study Educational Facilities

(1

965),

1

24.

.

.

New England Journal of Public Policy

24.

Ibid.,

66, 69.

25. Ibid, 56.
26. Ibid., 66.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., 80-81.

29.

Ibid.,

275, 253.

30.

Ibid.,

170.

31

See Massachusetts General Court, Special Commission to Investigate the Educational Systems
of the Commonwealth (Boston, 1919); and General Court, Special Commission Established to
Investigate and Study Certain Problems of Education in the Commonwealth (Boston, 1950), for
findings on poor teacher preparation, the low percentage of state funding of local education
costs, and the serious disparity in educational financing of poor and wealthy school districts in
the state.

32. General Court, Special

Commission

to Investigate

and Study Educational Facilities

(1

965), 31

33. Ibid.
34.

Ibid.,

55.

35.

Ibid.,

82.

36.

Boston Globe, 28 December 1964,

1

.

Frank Zeo of the Massachusetts Federation of Taxpayers'

Associations protested the potential cost of implementing the specific suggestions.
37.

Boston Globe, 28 December 1964, 1,13.

38.

The major teachers' union involvement

in Willis-Harrington was the research provided by the
Massachusetts Teachers Association (MTA). It was not until 1967 that the union became more
adversarial and more involved in shaping public policy. For more on the MTA's coming of age
politically and its disagreements with education commissioner Kiernan over the union's right to
strike (which the commissioner said represented a "step towards anarchy"), see Boston Herald
Traveler, 13 October 1967, 52; also, Boston Globe, 27 October 1967, 1; 5 November 1967, 49; and
12 August 1968, 34.

Gordon and Alan Gordon, American Chronicle (New York: Atheneum, 1987), 391 400, 409.
The gross national product was increasing at a rate of 5 percent; unemployment was below 6
percent; and the rate of inflation was about 2 percent.

39. Lois

,

40. Charles R. Morris,

A Time of Passion: America

1960-1980 (New York: Penguin Books,

1986), 22,

23.

41

Campaign speeches and President Kennedy's first message to Congress emphasized the importance of education to the nation. See Tom Wicker, JFK and LBJ (New York: William Morrow & Co.,
1968), 25-26, 121.

42. Chapter 641 of the Acts of 1965, popularly referred to as the Racial Imbalance Law,

was enacted

on 18 August 1965.
43.

The Massachusetts State

Library at the State

House

in

Boston has useful newspaper indexes for

the 1960s and 1970s.
44. Kevin Harrington,

1985; also

chairman of the Willis-Harrington Commission; interview, Boston, 30 October

Forman

interview, 17 July 1985.

Commission, 1962-1965; telephone
August 1985. Also Ronald Jackson, former research associate, Massachusetts Education Study, 1962-1965; telephone interview, Boston to El Paso, Tex., 15
July 1985. Also, "Boston's imbalance fight became a legal tangle between the state Board of
[Public School] Education and the Boston School Committee," Boston Globe, 1 January 1967, sec.
A, 8. Also, Boston Globe, 1 May 1967, 17: "With the Legislature standing cynically by, the board

45. Paul Marsh, former research associate, Willis-Harrington
interview, Boston to Lincoln, Mass., 2

84

has spent
Little

of

its first

its

effort

that will apply in
46.

year hiring five key new workers and wrestling with the racial imbalance issue.
has been turned toward the critical function of mandating minimum standards
all

school

districts."

Boston Herald, 8 July 1973, sec. A, 4: "Parents were screaming that the Board of Education, in its
Racial Imbalance Law, was neglecting the needs of the white parent."

vow to support the 1965
47.

Forman interview, 17 July 1985. Twenty years after Willis-Harrington, local control was still in
command. The outcry from the Massachusetts Municipal Association and the Massachusetts
Association of School Committees that greeted House 6262, the omnibus reform bill of 1983-84,
was directed primarily at the fact that the proposed legislation would remove local control.

48. For a valuable perspective

Lockridge,

on the Puritan sense of community

49. General Court, Special

Commission

50.

Boston Herald, 29 November 1967,

51.

Ibid.,

1

in

Massachusetts, see Kenneth

A New England Town: The First Hundred Years (New York: W. W.

December

to Investigate

Norton

and Study Educational Facilities

& Co.,

(1

965),

1985).
1

28.

3.

1967, 33.

52. Ibid.
53.

Ronald Jackson interview, 1 5 July 1 985. "We didn't want to set up a police state to monitor the
out of education," Mr. Jackson said, and Kevin Harrington often reiterated that philosophy.

hell

54.

Bradbury Seasholes,

ed., Public

Education

in

Massachusetts: Problems and Challenges,

A Series on State Government and Public Responsibility (Medford,
and Public

for Citizenship
55.

Boston Globe, 3 January 1965, sec. A,

7.

F. Kiernan, "A Cost Analysis of House 3950 of 1965" (Boston, 1965),
Massachusetts State Library, State House, Boston.

Boston Globe,
all

58.

1

May

1967, 17:

"If

the board

observers, including politicians

nues

will

town

services."

be diverted

Robert McLain,

Jr.,

7 of

Affairs, 1965), 136.

56. Cornelius

57.

vol.

Mass.: Lincoln Filene Center

like

fails

to develop a strong

9,

image and pattern of action,

Harrington and Gov. Volpe, agree that the

totally into the reduction of real estate

available in

new tax

reve-

taxes and the expansion of other

under secretary of the Executive Office of Administration and Finance;

inter-

view, Boston, 16 October 1985.
59. William Crowley, executive assistant to the commissioner,

Massachusetts Department of Educa-

telephone interview, Boston to Quincy, Mass., 14 September 1987. Also see Diane Ravitch,
The Troubled Crusade (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 148.

tion;

60.

is a perennial reform topic in Massachusetts. Even
work of Willis-Harrington, Massachusetts had the greatest gap in educational
spending between districts. In 1978, because the disparities in educational spending levels
among school districts were still among the most extreme in the nation, a legislative commission
under the leadership of Rep. James Collins and Sen. Walter Boverini developed a new disbursement formula for state aid to education. The change targeted larger amounts of money to poorer

Increasing the state share of educational costs

a

decade

after the

districts to help equalize per-pupil

spending. Collins-Boverini reduced spending inequities be-

was rendered moot by Proposition 2 /2, which removed School Committee autonomy, thus putting state money under the control of selectmen and city councilors who
tween
were

districts

less

before

1

it

disposed toward funding education. See Edward Morgan, "Obstacles to Educational
Reform and Local Response in Massachusetts, 1978-1983," Journal of Educational

Equity: State

Finance 10 (Spring 1985): 441-59.
61.

Ibid.

62.

Robert Levey interview with William
Boston Globe, 10 July 1966, 14.

63.

Ibid.

Saltonstall, "Board's Future

85

Hinges on 'Real Progress,'"

.

,

.

.

New England Journal of Public Policy

64. In the article,

Chairman

Saltonstall also said, "I'm sorry, but

so far as

relations or at least

it

means the creation

I

have a healthy suspicion of public

of an image."

65.

Boston Globe, 28 December 1964,

66.

Thomas Wojtkowski, vice-chairman, Massachusetts Education

13.

Study, 1962-1965; interview,

Boston, 19 June 1985.
67.

Owen

Kiernan and the Massachusetts Department of Education, "A Critique of House No.
1965), unpublished memorandum.

B.

3300" (Boston,
68.

Wojtkowski interview, Boston, 19 June 1985.

69. Robert Levey, former

Boston Globe, 30

Globe education

reporter,

"Education Reform Dying on the Vine," part

1

April 1967, 32.

on the problems of the old Board of Higher Education and on its replacement, the
Board of Regents of Higher Education, see Muriel Cohen, "A major overhaul for state colleges,"
Boston Globe, 11 June 1980, 1. Also 14 (editorial), 20, 21, 22.

70. For information

71

For a detailed analysis of the weaknesses of the Board of Higher Education, see John A. Stevens,

"A Process for Determining the Appropriate Role for the Massachusetts State College System"
(April 1980), a qualifying paper available in the Gutman Library of the Harvard University Graduate School of Education, Cambridge, Mass.
72.

Wojtkowski interview, Boston, 14 July 1987.

73.

Edgar

74.

Edward
Print,

The

Litt,

Political

Cultures of Massachusetts (Cambridge, Mass.:

MIT

Press, 1965), 177.

and Robert E. MacQueen, A Manual of the General Court (Boston: Causeway
1981), 386, lists Massachusetts governors since colonial days.

75. Michael

B. O'Neill

J.

Bennett, "$244 Million Urged for Schools," Boston Herald, 28

76. Paul Costello,

"Governor Signs Education

Bill,"

December

Boston Herald, 29 June 1964,

1964,

1

1

Reid, ed., Education: An Obligation—An Opportunity, proceedings of the Governor's
Conference on Education, 1966 (Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts, 1966), 4.

77.

James S.

78.

Boston Globe, 12 October 1966,

79. Levey, "Education
80. Chapter

2.

Reform Dying on the

Vine," part 2,

Boston Globe,

572 of the Massachusetts General Laws of 1965, sec.

Massachusetts Legislative Documents, 1965, House 3300, sec.

4,

82.

Chapter 572 of the Massachusetts General Laws of 1 965, sec.

G.

Amendments

May

1967,

1.

1 F.

81.

83. David B. Wilson, "All

1

1

January 1965.

Rejected as House Votes Willis

Bill,"

Boston Herald, 27

May

1965,7.
84. Levey, "Education
85.

imposed

88.

Vine," part 1,1.

Massachusetts Department of Education, "A Management Study of the Massachusetts Board
and Department of Education" (Quincy, 1985), 1.

86. Proposition 2 1/2

87.

Reform Dying on the

a limit

was passed as a referendum in 1978. It reduced automobile excise taxes and
on the amount of money collected through the property tax.

Boston Globe, 2 March 1969, 27. See note 60.
Massachusetts education commissioner Harold Raynolds discussed
1986, 3, and Boston Herald, 26 March 1987, 18.

this in the

Boston Herald, 25

November
89.

The Massachusetts

Institute of Social

and Economic Research (MISER), located

at the University

of Massachusetts at Amherst, has just completed a study of current teacher supply and
in

Massachusetts.

MISER found

any conclusions are drawn from

this,

one should

86

realize

demand

about 13.6 to 1 Before
that special-needs teachers and bilingual

that the current student-teacher ratio

is

.

teachers (two categories that did not exist in public schools in 1965) may have very few students
in their classes, thus significantly lowering the averaged ratio statewide.
90.

Joseph Cronin, former Massachusetts secretary of educational
1985; Robert Levey, interview, Dorchester, Mass.,

91.

92.

Forman

interview,

Boston Globe, 30

1

April 1967, 32.

Over one hundred education studies are

affairs; interview,

Marsh

interview, 2

identified in Paul E. Marsh,

Studies of Education."
93.

See Boston Globe, 18 August 1987,

94.

Harrington interview, 30 October 1985.

1

,

for detailed test data

87

Boston, 3 July

July 1984.

on

this.

August 1985.

"A Study of Massachusetts

